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Abstract 
Three studies using abstract materials tested possible moderators of the feature-positive effect in 
hypothesis evaluation whereby people use the presence of features more than their absence to judge 
which of two competing hypotheses is more likely. Drawing on a distinction made in visual 
perception research, we tested whether the feature-positive effect emerges both when using non-
substitutive features, which can be removed without replacement by other features, and substitutive 
features, the absence of which implies the presence of other features (e.g., the color red, the absence 
of which entails the presence of another color). Furthermore, we tested whether presenting to 
participants both the clue occurrence probabilities (which are needed to consider clue presence) and 
their complements (which are needed to gauge the impact of the absent clues) decreased the feature-
positive effect. The results showed that regardless of the type of feature (i.e., non-substitutive vs. 
substitutive), participants provided more responses consistent with an evaluation of the subset of 
present clues compared to all other kinds of responses. However, the use of substitutive features 
combined with an explicit presentation format of probabilistic information had a debiasing effect. 
Furthermore, the use of substitutive features negated participant sensitivity to the rarity of clues, 
whereby the feature-positive effect decreased when there was one absent clue and two present clues 
for problems in which the exclusive consideration of the presence of features did not suggest the 
correct response.  
 
Keywords: hypothesis testing; the feature-positive effect; substitutive features; the rarity effect
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Moderators of the Feature-Positive Effect in Abstract Hypothesis-Evaluation Tasks 
The feature-positive effect (FPE) refers to the tendency of human and non-human animals to 
search for or use occurrences (rather than the non-occurrences) as cues to accomplish a task. 
Jenkins and Sainsbury first introduced this term to describe the asymmetry in pigeon performance 
when learning perceptual discrimination. Pigeons learned to discriminate between food-reinforced 
trials (positive trials) and non-reinforced trials (negative trials) faster when a black dot (i.e., the 
feature) appeared on the response key for positive trials and when it was absent on negative trials 
rather than the reverse (Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1969, 1970). This phenomenon has been described in 
similar forms across a variety of species (including humans), ages, experimental settings, and 
cognitive processes (e.g., Bourne & Guy, 1968; Estes, 1976; Fazio, Sherman, & Herr, 1982; Jenkins 
& Ward, 1965; Mandel & Lehman, 1998; Nahinsky & Slaymaker, 1970; Neisser, 1963; Newman, 
Wolff, & Hearst, 1980; Wells & Lindsay, 1980).  
The factors that undermine the FPE have been investigated rarely. For example, in a study of 
human visual perception, Treisman and Souther (1985) compared search times for the presence 
versus the absence of a target in a display of distractors. In their first experiment, participants 
detected a circle with an intersecting line in a display of circles without such lines (i.e., the presence 
condition) faster than a circle without an intersecting line among circles with these lines (i.e., the 
absence condition). The lines are “features that can be removed without being replaced by others” 
(Treisman & Souther, 1985); that is, they are non-substitutive features because they do not need to 
be replaced by other features when absent. In their second experiment, they compared searches for 
presence and absence using color to distinguish between targets. Specifically, participants searched 
for a green target among red and black distractors (presence condition) or looked for a non-green 
target (which thus was either red or black) among green distractors (absence condition). Color is a 
“substitutive feature” (Treisman & Souther, 1985); that is, the absence of a color implies the 
presence of another color. Present and absent features should be equally distinctive and detectable 
using this method. In fact, the results did not reveal an asymmetry between participant latencies in 
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the presence condition compared with the absence condition. Treisman and Souther (1985) 
suggested that the absence of the substitutive feature (green) was spontaneously recoded as the 
presence of another (red or black). 
The present article is concerned with whether the use of substitutive features moderates the 
FPE in human reasoning, specifically in belief revision. We focused on the evaluation stage of 
hypothesis development, wherein people interpret available data to determine whether they confirm, 
disconfirm, or whether they are irrelevant to the hypothesis being tested (e.g., Klayman, 1995; 
McKenzie, 2004, 2006). This issue is relevant not only for theoretical reasons but also for potential 
applications. Given that the FPE with regard to hypothesis evaluation could have detrimental results 
(e.g., when judges consider circumstantial evidence as more convincing than the absence of 
evidence), reducing this phenomenon might enhance efficient judgment and decision making.  
Recently, Cherubini and his colleagues devised probabilistic tasks to examine the FPE with 
regard to human hypothesis evaluation directly (Cherubini, Rusconi, Russo, & Crippa, in press; 
Rusconi, Marelli, Russo, D’Addario, & Cherubini, in press). Specifically, participants determined 
from which of two card decks the experimenter drew a card (Cherubini et al., in press; Rusconi et 
al., in press). Each card featured between 0 and 5 letters. Participants were informed which letters 
were printed on the drawn card and which were not. A table showed the number of cards that 
depicted all possible letters in each deck. Participants were also informed that the experimenter had 
selected the deck randomly. The absence of letters was conveyed to participants by denying their 
presence, that is, via negative instructions such as “There is neither a D nor an F on the drawn card” 
and by showing to participants that they were not printed on the drawn card. The authors also 
manipulated the letter distribution presentation format in the cards of the two decks by presenting 
participants with the distributions of letter occurrences, those of letter non-occurrences, or both. The 
findings revealed a robust FPE regardless of the letter distribution presentation format.  
The method that Cherubini et al. (in press) and Rusconi et al. (in press) used to convey the 
absence of features might have caused an imbalance such that present and absent clues were 
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unequally distinctive and detectable. Letters, unlike colors, are not substitutive features: other 
features do not necessarily replace them when absent (e.g., a card might reveal a blank in place of a 
letter). Treisman and Souther (1985, Experiment 1) showed that when non-substitutive features are 
used, there is a presence-absence asymmetry in search latencies. Accordingly, the use of negative 
sentences (e.g., “There is neither a D nor an F on the drawn card”) and non-substitutive features to 
convey an absence in the studies by Cherubini and colleagues might have directed participant 
attention to the present clues, thereby artificially decreasing the value of the absent clues. This 
hypothesis rests on two findings. First, people have greater difficulty handling negative relative to 
positive sentences (e.g., Hearst, 1991; Van Wallendael, 1995; Wason, 1959, 1961). Therefore, the 
negative instructions used to describe the absence of letters might have required participants a 
further processing step relative to the affirmative instructions used to describe their presence. 
Second, present and absent clues with non-substitutive features do not require the same amount of 
perceptual processing (Treisman & Souther, 1985). 
Bayesian background 
Bayes’ theorem has become a widely used method in the hypothesis-testing literature for 
updating initial beliefs. This theorem can be expressed in odds (e.g., Beyth-Marom &Fischhoff, 
1983; Cherubini, Rusconi, Russo, Di Bari, & Sacchi, 2010; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983) as 
follows: 
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where “p()”, “|”, “¬”,“H”, “¬H”, and “D” denote “the probability of”, “given that”, the 
logical symbol for negation, the hypothesis to be tested, the alternate hypothesis, and the new 
evidence, respectively. The terms are defined as follows from left to right: (1) the posterior odds, 
that is, the ratio of the probability that the hypothesis is true over the probability that the alternate 
hypothesis is true given the same information; (2) the prior odds, that is, the ratio of the probability 
that the hypothesis is true over the probability that the alternate hypothesis is true prior to collecting 
THE FEATURE-POSITIVE EFFECT IN HYPOTHESIS EVALUATION 6 
new data; (3) the likelihood ratio (LR), that is, the ratio of the probability of observing new data 
given that the hypothesis is true over the probability of observing the same data given that the 
alternate hypothesis is true. The LR provides a measure of the evidential strength of the data and is 
of interest in this study because the tendency to be swayed by the LR of a feature’s presence, 
( ) ( )HDpHDp ¬|| , over the LR of a feature’s absence, ( ) ( )HDpHDp ¬¬¬ || , is evidence of an 
FPE in hypothesis evaluation. 
There are several alternate models of the informativeness of a datum (e.g., Crupi, Tentori, & 
Gonzalez, 2007; Nelson, 2005, 2008; Nelson, McKenzie, Cottrell, & Sejnowski, 2010). One of 
these models is information gain (IG), which differs from LR in that it considers the probative 
impact of data by accounting for both the prior probabilities and the posterior probabilities of the 
hypotheses. Specifically, IG is based on Shannon’s (1948) definition of entropy (i.e., uncertainty), 
whose unit of measure is bit and is defined as follows:  
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where X is a discrete random variable, and  are the possible values whose probability are 
. IG is the difference between the entropy prior to receiving new information (“D”) and the 
entropy after receiving new information. This equation is as follows. 
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In other words, IG models the information value of new evidence, which may be either 
present or absent, by measuring how much the new data either reduce or increase the initial 
uncertainty about which of the hypotheses is more likely1.  
Surprisal and clue rarity 
Measuring the degree to which the occurrence of a piece of evidence is “surprising” is 
possible with a term within the entropy formula described above. Specifically, “surprisal” (Tribus, 
1961) can be expressed as follows.  
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( )ixp2log−  
That is, whenever the probability of an outcome is 1, the surprise of seeing it is 0 bits. 
Conversely, a highly unlikely outcome is very surprising. For example, when the probability of an 
outcome is .01, the surprisal is 6.64 bits. According to this notion (also called “self-information” in 
information theory), the occurrence of a rare event is more diagnostic than that of a common event 
(for similar arguments, see the “rarity assumption” in Oaksford & Chater, 1994; see also Anderson, 
1990, pp. 149–160; McKenzie, 2006, p. 580; McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2000, 2007). Sensitivity to 
rare events is relevant to the present paper because Newman et al. (1980) hypothesized that the FPE 
might have evolved because non-occurring events are relatively more common, and thus less 
diagnostic, than occurring events in nature. The present studies tested whether participant sensitivity 
to the rarity of data moderates the FPE. 
Overview of the present studies 
Three studies tested three possible moderators of the FPE in hypothesis evaluation. Those 
moderators are (1) the use of substitutive versus non-substitutive features; (2) the relative number of 
present versus absent features; and (3) the presentation format of feature probabilities (from which 
the LRs can be derived).  
Based on Treisman and Souther’s (1985) visual search results, FPEs that originate from 
perceptive mechanisms occur when non-substitutive features are used but not when substitutive 
features are used. Therefore, if an FPE is observed with substitutive features in our hypothesis-
testing task, then it probably originated from the later stages of information processing (i.e., 
reasoning). Study 1 tested this prediction using non-substitutive features, whereas Study 2 tested 
this prediction using substitutive features. 
Furthermore, based on Newman et al.’s (1980) hypothesis that the FPE evolved as a 
consequence of the information provided by relatively rare stimuli occurrences compared with 
relatively common stimuli non-occurrences, we expect that the FPE decreases when there are fewer 
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absent clues than present clues. All of the studies presented in this article tested this prediction by 
manipulating the relative number of present versus absent clues. 
Finally, we conjectured that the FPE should decrease as a consequence of a two-part 
manipulation. First, the perceptual processes of both present and absent clues should be equated 
when substitutive features are used (see Treisman & Souther, 1985, Experiment 2). Second, we 
expected to equate the computational processing of the values associated with both types of clues 
by presenting participants with both the feature probabilities (which are useful to determine the 
impact of the present clues) and their complements (which are relevant to assess the impact of the 
absent clues). Cherubini et al. (in press) found that this explicit presentation format of probabilistic 
information did not appreciably affect participants’ feature-positive choices; however, these authors 
used non-substitutive features. Accordingly, we hypothesized that equating both the perceptual 
processing and computational steps required to assess the value of the present and absent clues 
should debias the FPE. Study 3 tested this prediction. 
Study 1 
Study 1 provided data to test whether feature type moderates the FPE. Previous studies 
(Cherubini et al., in press; Rusconi et al., in press) investigating the FPE in hypothesis evaluation 
have already identified that such an effect does occur when non-substitutive features are used. 
However, we required new data collected using non-substitutive features that could be converted 
into substitutive features; otherwise, any differences between studies using substitutive features and 
those using non-substitutive features may be attributed to the stimuli, that is, to whether or not they 
can be converted into substitutive features. This study was designed to address this methodological 
issue and test the reliability of the FPE in previous hypothesis-evaluation studies. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 42 volunteers (20 female, 22 male, mean age = 21.8 years, SD = 3.4, range: 19-37 
years; mean education = 15.5, SD = 2) took part in the study. 
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Materials 
Participants received a booklet that included a cover page (upon which they provided 
personal information, e.g., gender, age, and years of education), written instructions, and 12 
judgment tasks.  
 Each task included a card draw. Participants were told that a card was drawn from one of 
two 100-card decks. The deck was chosen at random (i.e., the prior probabilities of the two decks 
were equal: ). For each problem, participants surmised from which deck (Deck 
1 or Deck 2) a card was drawn. Cards either featured red shapes (i.e., triangles, circles, squares, or 
pentagons) or they did not. Specifically, each card had between 0 and 3 or 0 and 4 shapes printed on 
its face, depending on the type of problem (see the Design section below). Participants were told 
which red shapes were present and which were absent from the drawn card in each task. 
Participants were also shown a picture of the drawn card. A table reported the number of cards (out 
of the 100 within each deck) that were printed with each of the 3 or 4 shapes. The table values were 
different for each of the 12 tasks.  
( ) ( ) 5.21 == HpHp
Table 2 provides an example of a table and picture that were provided to participants. For 
example, the “12” in Table 2 indicates that 12 of the 100 cards from Deck 2 had a red triangle 
printed on them (Thus, a red triangle was missing on 88 cards.) The exemplar problem featured a 
drawn card with a red triangle and a red circle, but a red square was absent. The instructions stated, 
“There is a red triangle and a red circle on the card but no red square”. Thus, the presence of 
features was conveyed via an affirmative instruction, whereas the absence of features was conveyed 
via a negative instruction. 
For each problem, participants selected from which of the two decks the card was most 
likely drawn by checking one of three boxes labeled “Deck 1”, “Deck 2”, or “equiprobable”. If 
participants were unable to decide the source of the drawn card, then they checked the 
“equiprobable” box. The order of the three alternative conclusions was balanced; thus, there were 
six versions of the questionnaire2. 
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The normatively correct response to the problem illustrated in Table 2 (i.e., the response 
derived from the application of Bayes’ theorem) is “Deck 2”. This response is identical to the one 
that Bayes’ theorem suggests given only the absent clue, whereas only considering the present clues 
would suggest the answer is “Deck 1” (see Problem 4 in Tables 1-3). The subsets of present and 
absent clues suggested opposing decks in all problems (see Table 3). 
The instructions clarified that the number of cards printed with a red shape was independent 
of the number of cards printed with other red shapes. This clarification was meant to convey to 
participants that the features (i.e., the red shapes) were class-conditionally independent of each 
other. Thus, the marginal totals of the two decks should not necessarily sum to 100. Formally, the 
table values were the frequencies that corresponded to the constituent probabilities of the clue 
occurrence LRs. That is, 
( )1| HDp  and  ( )2| HDp
where “D” indicates the shapes (i.e., red triangle, red circle, red square, and red pentagon), 
“H1” denotes Deck 1, and “H2” denotes Deck 2. Table 1 reports the constituent probabilities of the 
LRs for all problems.  
The instructions reported a sample probability table and taught participants how to read it. 
Participants were also informed of the correct response for the sample problem, and they were 
prompted to not use a calculator and to not take notes when completing the task. The booklet also 
contained the 12 problems. 
Design 
The 12 problems originated from a 3 × 2 within-participants design with 2 problems per 
cell. One factor was correct-response type. The normatively favored hypothesis was the same 
hypothesis favored by the subsets of present clues (i.e., “presence-consistent” problems), absent 
clues (i.e., “absence-consistent” problems), or neither (i.e., “equiprobable” problems) (see Table 3). 
We also manipulated the present-to-absent feature ratio to test the rarity effect. There was an equal 
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number of present and absent clues in 6 problems (i.e., 2:2 problems) but more present than absent 
clues in the remaining 6 problems (i.e., 2:1 problems).  
Balancing factors 
We ensured that different clues were not asymmetrically diagnostic to avoid participant 
preferences for present versus absent clues based on informativeness considerations. 
When the posterior probabilities of the two hypotheses were unequal, the diagnosticity of all 
the clues was .2781 IG bits (see Table 3). This value corresponds to a shift of p = .3 from the prior 
probabilities. The level of diagnosticity for all the clues was set in accordance with the results of 
previous similar hypothesis-testing studies involving 130 non-experts. These studies found that the 
participant sensitivity threshold for clue diagnosticity was between .12 and .18 bits (Cherubini, 
Russo, Rusconi, D’Addario, & Boccuti, 2009). In the problems in which the hypotheses had equal 
posterior probabilities, the overall informativeness of the new information was null given that the 
prior probabilities were also equal.   
The diagnosticity of the present clue subset in the 4 equiprobable problems was similar to 
that of the absent clue subset, regardless of the number of present and absent clues. The mean of the 
absolute difference in IG between the present and absent clues across problems was .0014 (range = 
.0004-.0022). The mean deviation between the strength of present clues versus those of the absent 
clues in the 8 non-equiprobable problems was .3087 (range = .1670-.4263). However, the latter 
discrepancy in informativeness between the present versus the absent clues was balanced across the 
non-equiprobable problems. In half of these problems (i.e., Problems 3, 6, 10, and 11 in Table 3), 
the present clue subset had a mean of .3101 bits more than the absent clues subset. For the 
remaining problems (i.e., Problems 2, 4, 5, and 9 in Table 3), the absent clue subset had a mean of 
.3073 bits more than the present clue subset. There was not a significant difference between the 
present clue subset (M = .42, SD = .36) and the absent clue subset (M = .42, SD = .34) with regard 
to the IG across all 12 problems, t(11) = .01, two-tailed p = .99. 
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We also computed the IG of each clue in the 12 problems independent of the other clues and 
their present or absent status (i.e., the IG of each clue was computed as if it were present). No 
significant difference was observed between the IG of the present clues (M = .27, SD = .18) and the 
IG of the absent clues (M = .34, SD = .2), t(17) = -1.06, two-tailed p = .306. Furthermore, the 
maximum present clue IG was .5463 bits, which was lower than the maximum absent clue IG 
(.6627 bits). No present clue had a higher IG than the maximum absent clue IG. In contrast, only 
one of the 18 absent clues had a higher IG (.6627 bits) than the maximum present clue IG. Notably, 
the clue with the highest IG was a present clue in 6 problems, whereas the clue with the highest IG 
was an absent clue in the remaining 6 problems. We concluded that our stimuli were sufficiently 
balanced to ensure that absent clues were not overlooked due to the greater informativeness of 
present clues. 
Dependent variable 
We classified participant responses regarding the most likely hypothesis into three groups: 
those that considered only the present clues (i.e., “presence-consistent” responses), those that 
considered only the absent clues (i.e., “absence-consistent” responses), or those that considered 
neither (i.e., “equiprobable” responses). The correctness of participants’ responses provided an 
additional classification. Specifically, their responses were normatively correct when they chose 
either the normatively favored deck in the non-equiprobable problems (i.e., “presence-consistent” 
responses in “presence-consistent” problems and “absence-consistent” responses in “absence-
consistent” problems) or “equiprobable” responses in “equiprobable” problems. All other responses 
were classified as incorrect. According to this classification, a preference for presence-consistent 
responses over either absence-consistent or equiprobable responses in absence-consistent and 
equiprobable problems revealed an FPE. Furthermore, although presence-consistent responses to 
presence-consistent problems were normatively correct, greater accuracy in presence-consistent 
problems compared with absence-consistent and equiprobable problems indicates an FPE. 
Procedure 
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Volunteers for the study completed the questionnaire in quiet places or study rooms. They 
received the booklet upon providing consent. There were no time constraints; thus, participants 
were able to complete the task at their own pace. Upon completion, participants were thanked and 
debriefed. 
Results 
The number of presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable responses 
Table 4 shows the results from a series of hypergeometric tests on the number of presence-
consistent, absence-consistent and equiprobable responses for each type of problem. Presence-
consistent responses were significantly preferred over the other response types in all conditions but 
two: the 2:1 absence-consistent and equiprobable problems. Furthermore, participant accuracy was 
higher in presence-consistent problems compared with absence-consistent and equiprobable 
problems (see the bold diagonal line in Table 4). These findings suggest that an FPE affected 
participants, but the rarity of clues moderated this effect. In particular, the FPE decreased when 
there was one absent clue and two present clues, although this result held only when the presence-
consistent responses were incorrect.   
Analysis of presence-consistent responses 
The previous analysis suggests that clue rarity (present-to-absent feature ratio) and problem 
type (correct-response type) interacted to influence the number of presence-consistent responses. 
Thus, we explored this interaction. Given that ANOVAs on count data can yield spurious results 
(e.g., Jaeger, 2008), we analyzed the number of presence-consistent responses (range = 0 to 2 per 
cell) using a repeated-measures generalized linear model with a Poisson distribution for the 
response variable using the SASTM statistical package. This within-participants study used a 3 
(correct-response type: presence-consistent vs. absence-consistent vs. equiprobable) × 2 (present-to-
absent feature ratio: 2:2 vs. 2:1) design. There was a significant first-level effect of the present-to-
absent feature ratio, χ2 = 15.82, df = 1, p < .0001, due to the larger number of presence-consistent 
responses in 2:2 (M = 1.25, SD = .75) versus 2:1 problems (M = .93, SD = .82). There was also a 
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significant first-level effect of correct-response type, χ2 = 10.68, df = 2, p = .0048, indicating that 
the number of presence-consistent responses was higher in the presence-consistent problems (M = 
1.32, SD = .73) compared with absence-consistent (M = .96, SD = .81), χ2 = 8.28, df = 1, Bonferroni 
adjusted p = .008, and equiprobable problems (M = .99, SD = .81), χ2 = 7.16, df = 1, Bonferroni 
adjusted p = .0148. Finally, the interaction between correct-response type and the present-to-absent 
feature ratio was significant, χ2 = 7.15, df = 2, p = .0280. Specifically, there were no differences in 
the number of presence-consistent responses between the 2:2 (M = 1.33, SD = .72) and 2:1 (M = 
1.31, SD = .75) problems in the presence-consistent problems (i.e., when presence-consistent 
responses were correct), χ2 = .03, df = 1, Bonferroni adjusted p = 1. Conversely, the number of 
presence-consistent responses was greater for 2:2 (M = 1.19, SD = .83) versus 2:1 (M = .74, SD = 
.73) problems in the absence-consistent problems, χ2 = 11.65, df = 1, Bonferroni adjusted p = .0018. 
Similarly, there were more presence-consistent responses for the 2:2 (M = 1.24, SD = .69) versus 
2:1 problems (M = .74, SD = .86) in the equiprobable problems, χ2 = 11.31, df = 1, Bonferroni 
adjusted p = .0024.  
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 provide evidence for the reliability of the FPE in hypothesis-
evaluation tasks that use absent, non-substitutive features (see Cherubini et al., in press; Rusconi et 
al., in press). In fact, participants chose significantly more presence-consistent responses than 
absence-consistent and equiprobable responses in most conditions. Furthermore, the greater 
accuracy of participants in presence-consistent problems compared with the other problem types 
provides evidence of the FPE. The rarity of absent clues undermined the FPE, however, which is in 
line with Newman et al.’s (1980) hypothesis as well as the tenet of information theory that states 
that rare observations are valued as more informative than common observations. However, 
participant sensitivity to the rarity of absent clues was selective in that it emerged only for the 
problems in which the presence-consistent responses were incorrect (i.e., in absence-consistent and 
equiprobable problems). The interaction between correct-response type and the present-to-absent 
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feature ratio reveals this finding. Thus, participants were partially sensitive to the formal correctness 
of the responses. The significant first-level effect of correct-response type also provides support for 
this sensitivity. Accordingly, only when normative soundness corroborated the presence-consistent 
responses did the rarity of the absent clues not undermine the FPE. 
Study 2 
Study 2 investigated whether the FPE persisted when features were substitutive, that is, 
when a feature’s absence entailed the presence of another feature. For example, when a figure is 
present, the absence of a color implies the presence of a different color. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 42 volunteers (23 female, 19 male, mean age = 21.9 years, SD = 3.6, range: 19-39 
years; mean education = 15.6, SD = 2.3) took part in the study. 
Materials, procedure and design 
The materials, procedure and design were identical to those applied in Study 1 except for the 
use of substitutive features. This method entailed the presence of a picture of the drawn card with 
the absent clues as well as the present clues (see Table 5). Furthermore, we used affirmative 
instructions when presenting the absent clues to participants (e.g., in the problem illustrated in 
Table 5, the instructions read, “There is a red triangle, a red circle and a yellow square on the drawn 
card”). 
Results 
The number of presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable responses 
Table 6 reports the results of a series of hypergeometric tests on the number of presence-
consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable responses for each problem type. Participants 
chose more presence-consistent responses than absence-consistent and equiprobable responses in all 
conditions. The FPE also emerged in the form of greater participant accuracy in the presence-
consistent problems compared with the other problem types (see bold diagonal line in Table 6). 
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Compared with Study 1, absent clue rarity did not undermine the FPE. In contrast, presence-
consistent responses occurred most frequently for problems in which there was one absent clue, two 
present clues, and the presence-consistent responses were correct (i.e., presence-consistent 
problems). The FPE decreased in 2:1 compared with 2:2 problems for both absence-consistent and 
equiprobable problems, but this effect was smaller than that of Study 1. 
Analysis of presence-consistent responses 
As in Study 1, we explored the effects of the present-to-absent feature ratio and correct-
response type. The number of presence-consistent responses was analyzed using a generalized 
repeated-measures model with a Poisson distribution. The predictors were correct-response type 
(the normatively correct response was presence-consistent, absence-consistent or equiprobable) and 
the present-to-absent feature ratio (2:2 vs. 2:1). There was a significant first-level effect of correct-
response type, χ2 = 11.19, df = 2, p = .0037, which showed that the number of presence-consistent 
responses was higher for presence-consistent problems (M = 1.39, SD = .76) compared with 
equiprobable (M = .95, SD = .73), χ2 = 10.25, df = 1, Bonferroni adjusted p = .0028, and absence-
consistent problems, although only marginally (M = 1.15, SD = .84), χ2 = 4.46, df = 1, Bonferroni 
adjusted p = .0694. Conversely, there was not a significant first-level effect of the present-to-absent 
feature ratio, χ2 = .14, df = 1, p = .7074, due to the lack of differences in the number of presence-
consistent responses between the 2:2 (M = 1.13, SD = .79) and 2:1 problems (M = 1.20, SD = .80). 
There was also a significant interaction between correct-response type and the present-to-absent 
feature ratio, χ2 = 12.91, df = 3, p = .0048. Specifically, participants provided more presence-
consistent (i.e., normatively correct) responses for 2:1 (M = 1.64, SD = .66) versus 2:2 problems (M 
= 1.14, SD = .78) for presence-consistent problems, χ2 = 10.26, df = 1, Bonferroni adjusted p = 
.0042. Conversely, there was no difference in the choice of presence-consistent responses between 
2:1 (M = 1.05, SD = .82) and 2:2 (M = 1.26, SD = .86) absence-consistent problems, χ2 = 2.79, df = 
1, Bonferroni adjusted p = .2841. Finally, there was no significant difference in the number of 
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presence-consistent responses between 2:1 (M = .90, SD = .73) and 2:2 equiprobable problems (M = 
1, SD = .73), χ2 = .53, df = 1, Bonferroni adjusted p = 1. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 are at odds with those of Treisman and Souther (1985, Experiment 2). 
Although we used substitutive features, we found evidence for an FPE, whereas Treisman and 
Souther (1985, Experiment 2) did not find a presence-absence asymmetry in the search latencies for 
substitutive features. The finding of an FPE regardless of the type of feature (i.e., substitutive in 
Study 2 versus non-substitutive in Study 1) suggests that it is not merely due to difficulties in 
perceptual processing for this type of hypothesis-evaluation task.  
Equating the perceptual processing of the present and absent clues did not attenuate the FPE; 
moreover, the use of substitutive features strengthened the FPE compared with Study 1. In fact, 
presence-consistent responses were chosen significantly more often than all other response types 
regardless of either the type of correct response or the ratio of present-to-absent features. 
Accordingly, we found evidence against our expectation of a decreased FPE when there are fewer 
absent clues than present clues. The lack of a significant present-to-absent feature ratio first-level 
effect reveals this finding. Surprisingly, the rarity effect reversed in terms of an increased FPE for 
the presence-consistent problems in which there was only one absent clue (i.e., 2:1 problems). 
Apparently, the use of substitutive features perceptually equates absent clues with present clues 
such that participants failed to consider the rarity of absent clues as a cue for responding consistent 
with the absent clue subset alone. 
Finally, as in Study 1, participants exhibited a residual sensitivity to formal correctness: they 
chose presence-consistent responses more often when they were correct than when they were not. 
The significant correct-response type first-level effect revealed this finding. However, the 
marginally significant difference in the number of presence-consistent responses between presence-
consistent and absence-consistent problems suggests that this sensitivity was weaker than that of 
Study 1. This finding is consistent with the view that Study 2 had a larger FPE than Study 1. 
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Study 3 
Study 3 tested the prediction that presenting participants with substitutive features and the 
LR constituent probabilities of occurrences and non-occurrences should undermine the FPE. We 
expect to equate the perceptual processing of both present and absent clues as well as the 
computational steps required by the assessment of the value associated with both types of clues. In 
fact, the use of substitutive features should cause the present and absent clues to be equally 
perceptible (Treisman & Souther, 1985, Experiment 2). At the computational level, participants do 
not need to infer the complements from the table to gauge the evidential strength of the absent 
clues. Moreover, this method uses affirmative instructions to convey present and absent clues. Thus, 
both types of clues should be indistinguishable from each other. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 66 volunteers (29 female, 37 male, mean age = 23.3 years, SD = 3.4, range: 19-42 
years) took part in the study. 
Materials, procedure and design 
The materials, procedure and design were identical to those used in Study 2, except that 
participants viewed both the probabilities of feature occurrences and those of feature non-
occurrences (see Table 7), and the presentation order of the 12 judgmental tasks was randomized. 
The balance of the presentation order of the three alternative conclusions was identical to the 
previous studies. 
Results 
The number of presence-consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable responses 
Table 8 reports the results of a series of hypergeometric tests on the number of presence-
consistent, absence-consistent, and equiprobable responses for each problem type. Contrary to 
previous studies and in keeping with our hypothesis, the FPE was virtually undetectable. In fact, 
participants chose presence-consistent responses more frequently than the other response types for 
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the presence-consistent problems. Furthermore, they chose absence-consistent responses more often 
than presence-consistent and equiprobable responses for the absence-consistent problems. However, 
they did not choose equiprobable responses more often than the other responses for the 
equiprobable problems. The latter finding might be caused by the lower informativeness of both 
present and absent clue subsets with regard to the equiprobable problems compared with presence-
consistent and absence-consistent problems (see Table 3). 
Analysis of presence-consistent responses 
As in the previous studies, we analyzed the number of presence-consistent responses using a 
generalized repeated-measures model with a Poisson distribution. The predictors were correct-
response type (the normatively correct response was presence-consistent, absence-consistent or 
equiprobable) and the present-to-absent feature ratio (2:2 vs. 2:1). There was a significant first-level 
effect of correct-response type, χ2 = 43.96, df = 2, p < .0001, due to the higher number of presence-
consistent responses for presence-consistent problems (M = 1.29, SD = .68) compared with 
absence-consistent (M = .37, SD = .54), χ2 = 43.45, df = 1, Bonferroni adjusted p < .0002, and 
equiprobable problems (M = .83, SD = .77), χ2 = 21.39, df = 1, Bonferroni adjusted p < .0002. As in 
Study 2 (but contrary to Study 1), the present-to-absent feature ratio first-level effect was not 
significant, χ2 = 1.43, df = 1, p = .2323. This result was due to the lack of a difference between the 
presence-consistent responses in 2:1 (M = .89, SD = .82) versus 2:2 problems (M = .77, SD = .71). 
The interaction between correct-response type and the present-to-absent feature ratio was 
significant, χ2 = 14.23, df = 3, p = .0026. Similar to Study 2 (but in contrast to Study 1), participants 
provided more presence-consistent responses in the 2:1 (M = 1.52, SD = .68) than the 2:2 condition 
(M = 1.06, SD = .6) for presence-consistent problems, χ2 = 13.64, df = 1, Bonferroni adjusted p = 
.0006. In contrast, there was no difference in the number of presence-consistent responses between 
the 2:1 (M = .41, SD = .58) and 2:2 conditions (M = .33, SD = .51) for the absence-consistent 
problems, χ2 = .61, df = 1, Bonferroni adjusted p = 1. Similarly, the difference between the 2:1 (M = 
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.74, SD = .75) and 2:2 conditions (M = .91, SD = .78) was also not significant for equiprobable 
problems, χ2 = 1.86, df = 1, Bonferroni adjusted p = .5172. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3 confirmed much of our hypothesis: the combined use of substitutive 
features and an explicit presentation format of probabilistic information had a debiasing effect. In 
fact, participants’ choices were usually in keeping with normative considerations (i.e., they 
preferred presence-consistent responses in presence-consistent problems and absence-consistent 
responses in absence-consistent problems). Their performances diverged from the Bayesian 
prescriptions only for the equiprobable problems. This result may reflect the lower diagnosticity of 
the present and absent clue subsets compared with the other problem types (see Table 3). The 
preference for presence-consistent responses in 2:2 equiprobable problems and the higher accuracy 
in presence-consistent problems compared with absence-consistent problems might be due to a 
residual facilitation in interpreting the relevant LRs of the present clues. In fact, there was a direct 
correspondence between the color red of the present shapes and the header “red” in the probability 
table. In contrast, participants had to recode the specific color of the absent shapes (i.e., green, blue, 
or yellow) to match the table header “other color” (see Table 7). Finally, we did not find evidence 
of a rarity effect, which replicates the results of Study 2. Participants did not provide significantly 
more presence-consistent responses in the 2:2 than the 2:1 conditions for the absence-consistent and 
equiprobable problems. In contrast, we found that the rarity effect was reversed for presence-
consistent problems, whereby participants chose more presence-consistent responses in 2:1 
compared with 2:2 problems. 
General Discussion 
This study is the first to show that the use of substitutive features, the absence of which 
implies the presence of another, does not by itself undermine the FPE in abstract hypothesis-
evaluation tasks. Such an effect would result in participants overemphasizing the evidence they 
received to determine which of two competing hypotheses was the more likely. This finding is 
THE FEATURE-POSITIVE EFFECT IN HYPOTHESIS EVALUATION 21
inconsistent with a previous visual perception study that did not find a significant search-latency 
presence-absence asymmetry when using substitutive features (Treisman & Souther, 1985, 
Experiment 2). As shown by Treisman and Souther (1985), substitutive features have the advantage 
of equating the perceptual processes that underlie the elaboration of present clues with those that do 
so for absent clues. Furthermore, substitutive features allowed us to convey the absence of features 
through affirmative instructions (Studies 2 and 3). This method avoids possible confounds due to 
people’s difficulty with handling negative information (e.g., Hearst, 1991; Van Wallendael, 1995; 
Wason, 1959, 1961). Accordingly, the failure of substitutive features to debias the FPE (Study 2) 
suggests that perceptual processes and the difficulties in interpreting negative information do not by 
themselves play a central role in causing this phenomenon in abstract hypothesis-evaluation tasks. 
However, we found that using substitutive features and explicitly presenting probabilistic 
information had a debiasing effect (Study 3). This finding is not surprising because we presented 
participants with (1) a picture of a drawn card featuring both the present clues (i.e., red shapes) and 
the absent clues (i.e., green, blue, or yellow shapes) and (2) the explicit clue occurrence LRs (which 
are needed to consider clue presence) as well as their complements, that is, the clue non-occurrence 
LRs (which are needed to gauge the evidential strength of the absent clues). In addition, we used 
affirmative instructions to present both present and absent clues. This method caused the present 
and absent clues to be essentially indistinguishable from each other. Thus, neither the use of 
substitutive features (Study 2) nor the presentation format of the probabilistic information 
(Cherubini et al., in press) appreciably undermined participants’ feature-positive choices by 
themselves; however, the combination of these manipulations did (Study 3). In other words, people 
might consider and use the absence of features when both the perceptual processing and the 
computational processing that underlie the assessment of present clues are equated with those that 
underlie the evaluation of absent clues and when both the presence and absence of features are 
conveyed via affirmative instructions. 
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The present studies also tested the possible moderator effect of clue rarity; we hypothesized 
that the FPE would decrease when there are fewer absent clues than present clues. This prediction 
originated from the information theory tenet that rare observations are more diagnostic than 
common observations (i.e., self-information or surprisal; Tribus, 1961; see also the “rarity 
assumption”, e.g., Anderson, 1990; McKenzie, 2006; McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2000, 2007; 
Oaksford & Chater, 1994). Furthermore, Newman et al. (1980) hypothesized that the FPE evolved 
because the occurrence of events is relatively less common and thus more diagnostic than the non-
occurrence of events in nature. We found a diminished FPE when there were fewer absent clues 
than present clues (i.e., 2:1 problems) in Study 1 but only for problems in which the present clues 
did not suggest the correct response. Conversely, we found a reversal of the rarity effect (i.e., more 
presence-consistent responses in 2:1 versus 2:2 problems) in Studies 2 and 3 but only for the 
problems in which the present clues suggested the correct response. Thus, the use of substitutive 
features in Studies 2 and 3 eliminated participant sensitivity to data rarity, whereas non-substitutive 
features fostered it in Study 1. Apparently, designing the present and absent clues to be equally 
distinctive and detectable caused the rare clues to be less salient. The absence of the rarity effect in 
Study 1 and the reversal of the rarity effect in Studies 2 and 3 in the presence-consistent problems 
indicate that also sensitivity to normative considerations influenced participant use of the rare clues 
in a way that deserves additional empirical investigation. Overall, these findings do not support 
Newman et al.’s (1980) hypothesis. In fact, we found that participants did not place more weight on 
all rare stimuli but only on some of them; for example, those that are more perceptually salient than 
common stimuli. 
Our research complements numerous studies that have described the FPE in similar forms 
including discriminative learning (e.g., Newman et al., 1980; Sainsbury, 1971); learning predictive 
relationships (e.g., Mutter, Haggbloom, Plumlee, & Schirmer, 2006); rule, attribute and concept 
identification (e.g., Bourne & Guy, 1968; Hovland & Weiss, 1953; Nahinsky & Slaymaker, 1970); 
contingency judgment (Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Kao & Wasserman, 1993; Mandel & Lehman, 1998; 
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Smedslund, 1963, the “accounting for occurrences hypothesis”, White, 2008, 2009, but for alternate 
results and interpretations, see McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2007 and Vallée-Tourangeau, 
Hollingsworth, & Murphy, 1998, Experiment 2); probability learning (Estes, 1976); and juridical 
judgment (Arkes, Shoots-Reinhard, & Mayes, in press, Experiment 2; Wells & Lindsay, 1980). The 
results of the present research are relevant not only because they provide additional evidence that 
this phenomenon generalizes to abstract hypothesis-evaluation tasks (see also Cherubini et al., in 
press; Rusconi et al., in press), but also because they illuminate the conditions under which the FPE 
does not occur.  
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Footnotes 
1 Although there are several metrics that are able to define the utility values of evidence, none are 
conclusively known to account for participant performance in hypothesis evaluation tasks (Nelson, 
2005 and Nelson et al., 2010 addressed this issue relative to the testing stage of hypothesis 
development.) Accordingly, the present study only considers IG. 
2 Participants also judged the confidence they placed in their responses using a 7-point scale that 
ranged from 1 = not confident to 7 = very confident. Confidence ratings may provide us with 
potential converging evidence for the FPE by showing the extent to which participants are 
convinced that judgments based on the featural presence (rather than on the featural absence or on 
all available evidence) are accurate. Although we measured participant confidence in the responses 
they provided for all studies presented in this article, we do not discuss these analyses for the sake 
of brevity and because they do not provide direct evidence for the moderator role of the variables 
tested. 
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Table 1  
Formal properties of the 12 judgmental tasks of the three studies (the likelihoods of the present 
clues are in boldface). 
 
Likelihoods 
Problem Deck Prior probabilities p 
(square) 
p 
(circle) 
p 
(triangle) 
p 
(pentagon) 
Posterior 
probabilities
1 .5 .35 .2 .13 .42 .5 1 2 .5 .1 .98 .39 .4 .5 
1 .5 .91 .7 .9 .9 .2 2 2 .5 .1 .23 .12 .06 .8 
1 .5 .9 .8 .82  .8 3 2 .5 .2 .4 .3  .2 
1 .5 .93 .3 .93  .2 4 2 .5 .1 .73 .12  .8 
1 .5 .12 .11 .1 .24 .8 5 2 .5 .87 .69 .9 .57 .2 
1 .5 .1 .14 .14  .2 6 2 .5 .92 .89 .94  .8 
1 .5 .89 .85 .11 .16 .5 7 2 .5 .51 .2 .12 .75 .5 
1 .5 .2 .13 .35  .5 8 2 .5 .98 .39 .1  .5 
1 .5 .56 .22 .1  .8 9 2 .5 .57 .68 .93  .2 
1 .5 .8 .7 .77 .64 .8 10 2 .5 .1 .1 .2 .12 .2 
1 .5 .14 .2 .28 .1 .2 11 2 .5 .9 .1 .93 .95 .8 
1 .5 .4 .87 .1  .5 12 2 .5 .2 .5 .13  .5 
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Table 2 
A sample probability table and a sample picture of a drawn card used in Study 1. The values in the 
table indicate the number of cards (out of 100) with each shape printed on them.  
 
 
    
deck 1 93 30 93 
deck 2 12 73 10 
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Table 3 
The properties of the 12 problems used in the three studies: correct responses, responses suggested 
by either the present clue subset or the absent clue subset, and the information gain (IG) values of 
each clue subset as well as all clues. 
 
Problem Correct response 
Response 
suggested 
by present 
clues 
Response 
suggested by 
absent clues 
IG of 
present 
clues 
IG of absent 
clues 
IG of all 
clues 
1 equiprobable Deck 2 Deck 1 .0201 .0184 0 
2 Deck 2 Deck 1 Deck 2 .7487 .9157 .2781 
3 Deck 1 Deck 1 Deck 2 .6150 .1887 .2781 
4 Deck 2 Deck 1 Deck 2 .2067 .6260 .2781 
5 Deck 1 Deck 2 Deck 1 .6611 .8808 .2781 
6 Deck 2 Deck 2 Deck 1 .8769 .6522 .2781 
7 equiprobable Deck 1 Deck 2 .0387 .0375 0 
8 equiprobable Deck 2 Deck 1 .0201 .0224 0 
9 Deck 1 Deck 2 Deck 1 .2030 .6260 .2781 
10 Deck 1 Deck 1 Deck 2 .8426 .5721 .2781 
11 Deck 2 Deck 2 Deck 1 .8020 .4832 .2781 
12 equiprobable Deck 1 Deck 2 .0152 .0148 0 
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Table 4 
The percentages (standard errors of the means in parentheses) of each participant-provided 
response for all problem types in Study 1. Having devised two versions of each problem type, 
participants provided 2 responses for each cell of the 3 × 2 design. The total number of participant 
responses per cell was 84 (N = 42). Asterisks indicate the statistical significance that resulted from 
the hypergeometric tests performed on the number of responses. Normatively correct responses are 
in boldface. 
 
  Responses 
 
Present-to-
absent ratio 
Presence-
consistent 
Absence-
consistent 
Equiprobable 
2:2 67% (.11) *** 18% (.1) 15% (.09) Presence-consistent 
problems 2:1 65% (.12) *** 14% (.08) 20% (.1) 
2:2 60% (.13) *** 25% (.11) 15% (.1) Absence-consistent 
problems 2:1 37% (.11) 44% (.13) 19% (.08) 
2:2 62% (.11) *** 25% (.1) 12% (.07) Equiprobable 
problems 2:1 37% (.13)  27% (.11) 36% (.12) 
 
 
*** = exact p < .001. 
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Table 5 
A sample probability table and a sample picture of a drawn card used in Study 2 (Problem 4 in 
Tables 1 and 3). The values in the table indicate the number of cards (out of 100) printed with 
shapes in red. Study 2 used substitutive features; thus, the absence of the color red denoted the 
presence of another color. In the example below, the drawn card features a red triangle, a red 
circle, and a yellow square; that is, the red square is absent.  
 
    
deck 1 93 30 93 
deck 2 12 73 10 
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Table 6 
The percentages (standard errors of the means in parentheses) of each participant-provided 
response for all problem types in Study 2. Asterisks indicate the statistical significance that resulted 
from the hypergeometric tests performed on the number of responses. Normatively correct 
responses are in boldface 
 
 
  Responses 
 
Present-to-
absent ratio 
Presence-
consistent 
Absence-
consistent 
Equiprobable 
2:2 57% (.12) *** 18% (.09) 24% (.09) Presence-consistent 
problems 2:1 82% (.1) *** 11% (.09) 7% (.06) 
2:2 63% (.13) *** 21% (.1) 15% (.09) Absence-consistent 
problems 2:1 52% (.13) *** 26% (.1) 21% (.08) 
2:2 50% (.11) ** 19% (.09) 31% (.11)  Equiprobable 
problems 2:1 45% (.11) * 31% (.11)  24% (.09) 
 
* = exact p = .027; ** = exact p = .002; *** = exact p < .001. 
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Table 7 
A sample probability table and a sample picture of a drawn card used in Study 3 (Problem 4 in 
Tables 1 and 3). The values in the table indicate the number of cards (out of 100) printed with 
shapes in red or a different color. As in Study 2, Study 3 used substitutive features; thus, the 
absence of the color red denoted the presence of another color. In the example below, the drawn 
card features a red triangle, a red circle, and a yellow square; that is, the red square is absent. 
 
 
    
 red other color red 
other 
color red 
other 
color 
deck 1 93 7 30 70 93 7 
deck 2 12 88 73 27 10 90 
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Table 8 
The percentages (standard errors of the means in parentheses) of each participant-provided 
response for all problem types in Study 3. Asterisks indicate the statistical significance that resulted 
from the hypergeometric tests performed on the number of responses. Normatively correct 
responses are in boldface 
 
 
  Responses 
 
Present-to-
absent ratio 
Presence-
consistent 
Absence-
consistent 
Equiprobable 
2:2 53% (.07) ***  20% (.07) 25% (.08) Presence-consistent 
problems 2:1 76% (.08) *** 14% (.07) 11% (.06) 
2:2 17% (.06) 45% (.09) ** 38% (.1) Absence-consistent 
problems 2:1 20% (.07) 64% (.09) *** 15% (.06) 
2:2 45% (.1) ** 27% (.08) 28% (.08) Equiprobable 
problems 2:1 37% (.09) 41% (.1) 22% (.08) 
 
** = exact p = .004; *** = exact p < .001. 
 
